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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS BIWEEKLY REVIEW

7 June 1978

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This long-standing dispute could have an unsettling effect in the area and adversely affect narcotics control programs in both countries.

The articles in this publication are prepared by analysts in the National Foreign Assessment Center primarily for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome.

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AFGHANISTAN: New Government May Push Opium Eradication Program

The military coup, which overthrew President Daoud on 27 April 1978, brought to power a government dominated by members of the Marxist, pro-Soviet Khalq Party. The new leaders may be more sincere in their dedication to the eradication of narcotics than the previous government, but they may have to move more cautiously, and some of their policies could conflict with international narcotics control programs.

Included in the Khalq manifesto, published in 1966 by now head of government Nur Mohammed Taraki, was a provision opposing the use of opium and alcohol. At the time, an attack on opium was unlikely to win Khalq any significant support either at home or abroad. Statements by the new Interior Minister, Nur Ahmed Nur, also seem to reflect an opposition to narcotics that goes beyond an effort to please the US and other Western countries. He has told UN officials that he wants opium production eliminated and has told the US Ambassador that he wants no Afghan opium to reach US addicts. His predecessor appeared to have little interest in the problem.

The Taraki government recognizes the value of continued good relations with the US and other Western countries, but probably places less importance on these relations than did President Daoud and so will be less susceptible to US pressure on narcotics and other issues. The influence of the USSR has increased, but in the past Moscow has shown little interest in the Afghan narcotics problem. A month before the Afghan coup, the Soviet Charge in Washington told US officials that narcotics was not a problem in Soviet-Afghan relations and gave no indication that the USSR was interested in cooperation with US efforts.

Increased Soviet influence and the Afghan Government's own suspicion of Western motives may make the

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government more reluctant to cooperate in police matters--including narcotics--with the Americans and other Westerners even under UN auspices. The recent decision against renewing the contracts of two West German narcotics advisers could well be a harbinger of greater reliance on nonaligned and Communist countries for help in law enforcement.

Initially at least, the inexperience of many Cabinet ministers and the wholesale replacement of lower ranking officials will decrease government efficiency in all fields, including narcotics.

Far more important than these factors, however, will be the government's relations with the Pathan tribes who produce by far the largest part of Afghanistan's opium. In the past, Afghan governments have been reluctant to take any action likely to stir up these tribes, and the new rulers may decide an even more cautious policy is required. They lack both the informal ties and the status in the tribal hierarchy that gave both President Daoud and the kings who preceded him some control over the tribes.

In dealing with the tribes, the government will have several alternatives. It could try to impose central authority both to remove a potential threat from the tribes and to end practices which as Marxists the new rulers can only regard as feudal. If successful, such a policy would put the government in a position to eradicate most of the country's opium production. The government is well aware, however, that an attempt to impose central authority would be more likely to bring on a full scale tribal rebellion, impose severe strains on the loyalty of the military--the bulk of the officer corps is Pathan--open the way to large-scale support for the tribes from Iran and Pakistan, and seriously threaten, if not topple, the present government.

A far safer course for the new government would be to avoid trouble with the tribes wherever possible, at least until it is in a much stronger position, presumably years from now. Such a policy would, of course, mean virtually no action against opium production in tribal areas.

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An attempt to win tribal loyalty by emphasizing issues such as the Pushtunistan dispute over Pathans in Pakistan might also be attractive to the new rulers. Such an approach would do nothing to limit opium production in Afghanistan and would complicate dealing with the problem in Pakistan.

Not all the new government's programs will necessarily conflict with the goal of opium eradication. Tighter currency and border controls, according to one report, caused an immediate collapse in the price of opium from \$170 a kilogram to \$30. Even if true, such a drastic change is likely to be temporary, but continued financial controls and the likelihood that both the Afghans and the Iranians will be watching the border more closely will hamper narcotics traffickers. If the government launches land reform programs as it has promised, it would have an opportunity to gain greater control of opium production in the process.


Whatever its intentions, however, the new government will be dealing with an immense narcotics problem with very limited resources and little authority in the opium-growing areas, and the prospects for any early success are as dim as under President Daoud. [REDACTED]

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AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN: Pushtunistan Dispute Could Hinder
Narcotics Control Effort

The longstanding Pushtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan, involving the status of Pakistani Pathans, could eventually again become a major source of instability in the region. The Pathans of Pakistan and Afghanistan may be the leading producers of illicit opium in the world, and a revival of the dispute would adversely affect narcotics control programs in both countries. Even during the recent period of unusually good relations between Kabul and Islamabad, both have been reluctant to pursue narcotics policies which risked tribal unrest. As a result, despite international efforts to promote crop substitution and the eradication of poppy fields, production has grown annually, possibly to the neighborhood of 1,000 tons this year. A revival of the Pushtunistan dispute would put an even higher priority on efforts to gain tribal loyalty and support in both countries to the detriment of any narcotics programs.

The new Afghan Government is trying to reassure Pakistan publicly and privately that it seeks a peaceful solution to the dispute. The Pakistanis, however, are deeply suspicious of Afghan intentions--with some justification. The new Afghan leaders, however, are likely to move slowly on the issue, at least until they have consolidated their position at home.

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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: These items, produced for another CIA Publication, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included because they concern developing situations that could impact on the international narcotics control effort.)

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BOLIVIA: The Election Scene

Bolivia continues to prepare for its first presidential election in a dozen years, scheduled for 9 July. The official candidate, General Juan Pereda Asbun, is still the likely winner, but his commanding lead has been cut by the efforts of rival candidates and by weaknesses in his own campaign.

The Opposition

As expected, Pereda's strongest challenge has come from Hernan Siles Zuazo, a former President who leads a coalition of leftist factions and is expected to do well among urban voters. Siles, however, is not strong in the rural areas, which account for some 60 percent of the vote.

General Rene Bernal, a former Defense Minister who is backed only by the Christian Democratic Party, presents the major surprise of the election campaign. At a recent rally Bernal drew crowds considerably larger than did Pereda and President Banzer a week earlier at the same location. Bernal's accomplishment was all the more noteworthy because the government blocked roads and tried to intimidate those who planned to see him. While Bernal's showing was impressive, he still lacks the broad publicity necessary for a victory, especially in the cities.

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25X1 The candidacy of retired Colonel Jose Patino Ayoroa, [redacted] is complicating the election scene. Patino joined the race formally on 7 May and has the backing of an important faction of one of the parties behind Pereda. As a result, Patino may be able to draw off some of Pereda's votes. It is uncertain what Patino--whose candidacy is unlikely to make major inroads--hopes to accomplish. One possibility is that Patino, who earlier opposed the election, may be temporarily in league with Banzer, his old enemy, who may still nourish hopes of postponing or canceling the election. If he can attract significant support among officers, Patino could tarnish Pereda's image as the "sole" candidate of a unified military. Banzer and Patino may see this as a means of splitting the military. Faced with this prospect, Banzer and Patino may reason, the officers may be made amenable to the ideal of putting off the election.

Victor Paz Estenssoro, who recently returned from exile, could also be an important factor in the election. He has just been named by his party to be its candidate in the upcoming elections. Paz, still regarded as the leader of one of the nation's two principal political movements, is playing his cards close to his vest, but has been in regular contact with various political groups. Given the continuing popularity of Paz, an endorsement by him of any candidate would be an important boost for the recipient.

The Government's Candidate

Pereda's own campaign effort is not without problems, despite his being Banzer's choice as official candidate. Banzer's support is lukewarm at best. If Banzer, as appears to be the case, does not in fact want elections, he more than likely hopes that Pereda will flounder and that other candidates will prove unacceptable to the military. That event might give the President an opportunity to perpetuate himself in power as the only "acceptable" solution to the political impasse. Banzer would seek to drive home his point by stressing that under his six-year rule, Bolivia has enjoyed relative political

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stability and economic growth. Moreover, Pereda's campaign is suffering from serious disagreements among the disparate elements of his tenuous coalition. Indeed, Pereda has still not published a campaign platform because of the bickering.

With elections six weeks away, none of Pereda's declared opponents appears capable of defeating him at the polls. There is also little prospect that opposition forces could unite in an effort to outdistance Pereda. What is clear, though, is that Pereda's lead is by no means as comfortable as was earlier assumed. [REDACTED]

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Noteworthy Political and
Economic Developments

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SRI LANKA: Countermeasures Against Tamil Terrorists

The assassination of five police officers in recent weeks by a militant Tamil youth organization, the Tamil State Liberation Tigers, has caused great concern within the government of President Jayawardene. Reluctant to impose emergency rule, which discredited the former regime, the government passed a bill on 19 May that proscribed the Liberation Tigers, who seek a separate state for Tamils in predominantly Sinhalese Sri Lanka, as well as any other organization that advocates the use of violence to achieve its goals. The bill was amended at the request of the opposition to limit its duration to one year. Under the new law the government may censor press coverage of matters relating to proscribed organizations. This last item reflects Jayawardene's reported concern that communal tensions, still simmering after bloody countrywide clashes in August 1977, may be touched off again if Sinhalese become targets of the separatists.*


The tough approach taken by the government to restore law and order in the north and east by reinforcing the Army and police as well as employing special legislative powers has yielded immediate results. The prominent publicity given 38 Liberation Tigers on a "most wanted"

*The Sinhalese, about 80 percent of the population, are the dominant group in Sri Lanka. The Tamil community, predominantly Hindu, is divided into two distinct groups which together make up 20 percent of the population. The Sri Lankan Tamils trace their origins back more than a thousand years to Tamil kingdoms centered around Jaffna in the north. The other group, the Indian Tamils, came in the mid-19th century to work on plantations in the Central Highlands. Indian Tamils are only peripherally involved in Tamil politics.

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list resulted in 32 arrests. Of this number, 22 surrendered to the authorities through a Tamil member of Parliament. Two suspects in a case involving the murder of four police officers have been captured. Those remaining at large are believed by officials to be abroad and include the son of the Tamil leader of the parliamentary opposition who is wanted in connection with the 1975 assassination of the mayor of Jaffna. We do not have the names of those arrested and are unable to judge at this time how seriously their arrest will affect the organization and activities of the Liberation Tigers.

Complementing the island-wide campaign to round up members of the proscribed movement, police officials are traveling abroad to seek foreign cooperation in apprehending and extraditing Tamil fugitives. If this effort is successful in effectively denying safe havens and seriously disrupting other support received from abroad, chances for a period of relative tranquility could improve. Another possible reaction by the militants, however, would be to step up indiscriminate attacks against the police and military who have been denounced as a Sinhalese "occupation army."

The Liberation Tigers have claimed responsibility for at least 10 terrorist acts going back to mid-1975. They are a small secret organization of young Tamils based primarily in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, principally in and around the city of Jaffna, and their membership has been variously estimated at between 50 and 200. The organization is carefully compartmented to prevent penetration by government security forces and appears to have been successful in penetrating local intelligence services targeted against them.

Cadre for the Liberation Tigers came initially from dissidents who broke with the youth wing of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)--a coalition formed in 1972 of several Tamil political parties. For the most part they are educated, unemployed youth frustrated by the inability of communal leaders to reduce discrimination against Tamils by successive Sinhalese governments.

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The first phase of the Liberation Tigers' program appeared to be to dissuade "collaborators" and "traitors" within the Tamil community itself. The targets of all the political killings claimed by them since 1975 have been Tamil politicians seeking accommodation with the government or officials investigating separatist activities. The tempo of the intimidation campaign increased significantly in early 1978 with a series of dramatic killings. In January, a Tamil member of Parliament who crossed over to the government was wounded by members of the Liberation Tigers, who publicized the attack as a warning to others who might consider cooperation with the Sinhalese. In April, four police officers who were investigating the incident were murdered. Another police intelligence officer pursuing the militants was killed by Tamil youths in Jaffna in early May. By limiting their targets to Tamils, the movement has appeared to be scrupulously avoiding actions that would provoke a confrontation with the majority Sinhalese.

Through much of the colonial period, well-educated, English-speaking Tamil graduates of missionary schools in Jaffna held a disproportionate number of positions in the civil service and the professions. With independence in 1947, the Sinhalese began to use their legislative majority to reduce the proportion of Tamils entering the university. The campaign became more intense between 1969 and 1977 when the rate of Tamil entrants fell from 41 to 16 percent.

The Sinhalese also resorted to linguistic nationalism and effectively blocked openings for talented Tamil youth by requiring fluency in Sinhala for government positions. Another threat to communal identity was the government's resettlement program, which provided

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land to Sinhalese in the Eastern Province--long considered by Tamils to be part of their traditional homeland.

Frustration with the continued erosion of Tamil status and opportunity reached its highest level during the 1977 election. The TULF campaigned in the north and east calling for a separate Tamil state. This call by the leadership, intended primarily to highlight the plight of the Tamils, was taken up by Tamil youth who saw it as a valid goal for the community. The TULF emerged from the election with 18 seats--enough to lead the opposition. Intense pressure by the militant youth, however, has forced the TULF leadership to continue to pay lipservice to the separatist rhetoric of the campaign rather than negotiate with the government to end discrimination against Tamils.

After the election, Jayawardene's United National Party (UNP)--largely a Sinhalese organization--took office with an overwhelming majority in Parliament. The new government unilaterally remedied some discriminatory policies in education and employment and began a limited dialogue with Tamil leaders. Meanwhile, the activist Tamil youth, citing the Tamil victories at the polls in the north and east, argued that the TULF had a "mandate" for a separate state. The moderate Tamil leadership thus finds itself in a quandary, fearing that it cannot actively pursue an arrangement with the Sinhalese without losing the support of the separatists and possibly even the moderate Tamils. The militants accuse the TULF hierarchy of "selling out" to the UNP, which will eventually "betray" the Tamils as previous governments have.

While pressure has been exerted on the TULF to prevent accommodation with the government, the UNP is facing corresponding constraints from the Sinhalese. The majority community believes that it has a right to preferred treatment in gaining the limited educational and employment opportunities that exist. Many believe that their share of positions would be threatened if the Tamils were permitted to compete on an equal basis through a merit system.

For the time being, Jayawardene appears to be satisfied with the limited special powers given him to proscribe

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and prosecute the separatists. He also seems confident that the impending administrative decentralization, which calls for district ministers, will provide a degree of autonomy to the Tamils that will moderate their demands. He cannot, however, make too many concessions without jeopardizing his political base in the Sinhalese community. He also must appear to be resolute in his efforts to eliminate Tamil terrorism. Conversely, a too heavyhanded attempt to repress the separatists could only increase the appeal of their program. Reports on the degree of popular support for the movement within the Tamil community are conflicting and may be attributed to a generational difference between youth and their elders. Many Tamil politicians and professionals do not accept the need for violence to achieve the equality advocated by their offspring.

If the UNP is unable to ensure law and order, the government's effort to promote foreign investment will be seriously affected as will be the overall prospects for economic recovery. The Jayawardene government is acutely aware of the interrelationship between economic prosperity and communal relations. A successful economic turnaround would remove many of the factors that alienate the Tamil minority, and the drive for a separate state could lose much of its appeal.

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PAKISTAN: Problems in Forming New Government

Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq may have abandoned or postponed indefinitely plans to form a government with the participation of political parties because of conditions demanded by the eight-party Pakistani National Alliance. Zia has been trying to form such a government for about two months but, with several parties refusing to take part, his only hope appeared to be an agreement with the Alliance. In the meantime, popular criticism of continued military rule is growing. Senior military officers are disillusioned with Zia and his policies, but are reluctant to challenge his leadership.

In forming a "national" government, Zia had hoped to mobilize popular support for a number of difficult economic and political decisions that he faces--including the fate of former Prime Minister Bhutto. He may also have hoped that the participation of political parties would quiet demands for an election and for the resumption of political activity. Zia would remain in control of government, with military officers holding key portfolios.

Several of the nation's most prominent politicians refused to join a government where they would have little power and be closely allied with the military regime. The Alliance had agreed to participate in the government, but apparently only if the government were clearly civilian with a "fully independent and powerful" civilian prime minister, and if the ban on political activity were lifted.

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
Zia's problems are compounded by increasing criticism among senior military officers of his weak and indecisive leadership. [REDACTED]

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Complaints focus on Zia's increasing dependence on civilian, rather than military, advisers. Some senior officers have emphasized that only national elections--unlikely for at least several more months--can solve Pakistan's political problems.

Despite resentment of Zia and his policies by senior officers, they are unlikely to challenge his leadership at this time. To do so would run counter to the structure and traditions of the Pakistani Army. Zia has reorganized the command structure to minimize, if not eliminate, the possibility of a serious threat [REDACTED]

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IRAN: The Shah and the Clergy

The Shah and Queen Farah used their annual visit to the religious shrine in Meshed on 28 May to attempt to open a dialogue with some of the religious community. An exchange of views between the Shah and the clergy took place during public speeches at the shrine.

Meshed is probably the easiest place to get such a dialogue going. The city is religiously significant because of the Shrine of the Imam Reza, the eighth of the 12 successors to Mohammad according to the Shiites, and it is visited by thousands of pilgrims each year. It has always been less important, however, as a political and religious center than Qom, where the most influential clergy reside and where theological education is centered.

Although the reason for the existence of the shrine at Meshed is religious, it is actually a secular institution. The chief administrator is the Shah--who is entitled to 10 percent of the income of the shrine. The deputy administrator who carries on the day-to-day business is the governor general of Khorassan Province. The shrine was once one of the major landowners in Iran and has been engaged in much social service and business activity.* The shrine's finances have always been a mystery, but it is known that in past decades substantial wealth could be accumulated by working there. Most of the shrine employees are not clerical, and the shrine and the Shiite clergy are independent of one another. Nevertheless, some clerics are indirectly connected with the shrine. A portion of the shrine's income is allotted

*Under the land reform the shrine lands apparently are now leased to present cooperatives for a period of 99 years rather than sold outright to the cultivators.

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to religious figures, some religious teachers and students are aided by shrine funds, and the shrine provides services for pilgrims visiting Meshed.*

Although considerable antiregime feeling has been expressed in Meshed in the past, especially by the most prominent religious leaders, the dissent has always been lower key than that expressed in Qom. The heavy involvement of the government in Meshed religious life, competition with the Qom clergy for funds and religious influence, and the generally less-politicized atmosphere make Meshed a natural place to attempt a rapprochement.**

Empress Farah was extensively photographed during the recent visit wearing the chador, a traditional full-length garment that for many is a symbol of religious orthodoxy. This is clearly intended as a signal to the more moderate among the clergy that the regime is not rejecting them and their concerns. Most Iranians will make the immediate connection with a widely known incident of Reza Shah's time.*** Whether this gesture will mollify a significant number of the influential clergymen remains to be seen. It will, however, give them a reasonable excuse for talking with the government with less risk of being accused of selling out. Too little is known

*But not as much as formerly. A century ago a pilgrim could expect six days free maintenance by the shrine. More recently a pilgrim--if he had good connections--might get a ticket good for one meal at the shrine guest house.

**A similar attempt by the Shah in 1967, however, led to a rebuff by the major Meshed mullahs, and the Shah's reception was attended only by lesser clerics presumed to be on the government's payroll.

***In 1936 Reza Shah prohibited the wearing of the chador. To emphasize the point the Queen and two daughters attended a religious service in Qom unveiled. The preacher chided them from the pulpit for such irreverence. When Reza Shah heard of the incident, so the story goes, he went to Qom, entered the mosque in his cavalry boots (footgear should be removed in a mosque), dragged the preacher out, and kicked him down the stairs. The incident failed to endear Reza Shah to the clergy.

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of the factionalism among the clergy to be certain, but it is likely that a considerable number of them, while unenthusiastic about the regime, would prefer not to confront it and risk greater losses in position and power than has already been the case.

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BAHAMAS: NARCOTICS SMUGGLING PROBLEM WORSENS. The Embassy in Nassau reports that it has become increasingly apparent over the past six months that the Bahamas is growing in importance as a link in the narcotics smuggling route from Latin America to the US. It comments that the area, because of its geographic configuration, is most difficult to police, and it has obviously become important in the movement of marijuana in bulk, primarily by ship and light aircraft, from the north coast of Colombia to the eastern US. It noted further that since the beginning of the year cocaine smuggling, mainly by couriers on commercial flights, has also drastically increased.

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BULGARIA: CLAIMS OPIUM IMPORTED FROM LAGOS, NIGERIA. During a recent discussion of opium poppy cultivation in Bulgaria, a Bulgarian official told an Embassy representative that Bulgaria imports opium from Lagos. The comment was made sort of inadvertently to illustrate the insignificance of Bulgarian domestic production. He also claimed that the UN had actually urged Bulgaria to produce more opium as it produces less than its quota and that Sofia had not agreed to increase production because poppy cultivation is not profitable in Bulgaria due to adverse climatic and soil conditions. Despite an attempt to follow up the Lagos comment, the Bulgarian official offered no specific data.

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BURMA: SPECIAL TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED TO COMBAT NARCOTICS TRAFFIC. The Special Intelligence Department of the Burmese Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence established a special task force last March under the Division of Drugs to coordinate the suppression of narcotics smuggling in the Golden Triangle and onward shipment out of Burma. The project is funded by the UN and involves the establishment of fixed bases in and around the Golden Triangle from which operations will be mounted.

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LAOS: INDICATION OF OPIUM PRODUCTION IN VIETNAM. The Embassy in Vientiane, in a recent response to a routine Washington query on opium production and cultivation in Laos, called attention to a recent report in the Hanoi press. The report noted that cadres of the 125th and 127th Border Defense Security Police had "patiently persuaded" people in seven border villages to stop smoking opium. The article goes on to say that, thanks to study sessions conducted by civic action teams, the local people had vowed to give up growing opium poppies. The Embassy pointed out that, aside from spurious reports from the Vientiane UNFDAC office of opium production in Vietnam's central highlands, this is the first recent indication of which the Embassy is aware of opium production in Vietnam. [REDACTED]

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NEPAL: INDICATIONS OF ILLICIT OPIUM PRODUCTION. Recent unevaluated reports received by the Embassy in Kathmandu indicate that some opium poppy cultivation is apparently being diverted from village use and directed toward illicit trade. Because of the increased use of Nepal as a route for opium/heroin traffic from the Golden Triangle, local authorities are unable to differentiate the local crop from that in transit. Evaluation of the information is further complicated by the inadequate data available on local production, which is grown on small plots by villagers. The UNFDAC representative, extrapolating from the limited data available and his on-site observations, estimates the annual opium production in Nepal to be 1,200 kilograms--most of which is used locally for medicinal purposes. The government, however, remains committed to its policy of not legalizing the growing of opium. In the fall of 1977, consideration was given to making opium an export crop but was rejected because of fears that the government could not control all aspects of production and prevent diversion into illicit channels. [REDACTED]

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TURKEY: ILLICIT OPIUM POPPY FIELDS REPORTEDLY FOUND IN SOUTHEASTERN PROVINCE. [REDACTED]

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The Turkish press carried an item last April about 2.5 hectares of illicit opium poppies being destroyed in the Konya area by the security forces. An Embassy report in late May, citing a reliable source, claimed that an opium poppy field about one-third of an acre in size had been discovered in southeastern Turkey near the town of Gaziantep. The Turkish National Police later claimed that this field had been Indian hemp rather than opium poppies. Because of adverse weather conditions in the licensed opium poppy growing area of southwestern Turkey, the area under poppy cultivation this year appears to be somewhat smaller than last year. It has been tentatively estimated that only about 50,000 hectares, as opposed to last year's 70,000 hectares, will actually be harvested this year. It is still too early to attempt any realistic estimate of poppy straw production for the current year, but the reduced area of cultivation suggests a smaller harvest than last year's 36,400 tons of poppy straw unless there are optimum conditions for the remainder of the growing season. [REDACTED]

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VENEZUELA-COLOMBIA: DRUG TRAFFICKERS REPORTEDLY TRADING ARMS FOR DRUGS. According to the Venezuelan Security Police, an alarming number of automatic and semiautomatic weapons--mostly the 9mm "grease gun" type and the popular M-16 rifle--have begun to show up along the Colombian-Venezuelan border west of Maracaibo. The police suspect that pistols also are being smuggled into the country, although none have actually been located yet. This speculation probably is due to the general popularity of such weapons. The Defense Attache in Caracas reports that available information strongly indicates that drug traffickers are flying the weapons into Colombia and trading

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them for illicit drugs for the international market. The reporting officer comments that it is uncertain whether the weapons are going only to local drug traffickers or are being passed to guerrilla/terrorists in the area. [redacted] the guerrillas may be attempting to expand their operations into the northwestern part of Venezuela. [redacted]

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BOLIVIA--Thirty Percent of Coca Crop Reported to be Illegal--TNDD, No. L/7808, p. 77. Pure cocaine production in Bolivia totals 600 tons per year according to a recent report from Interpol's security administration department, which recently met in Buenos Aires, Argentina. According to the report, 70 percent of the coca is grown by officially registered coca producers on 11,000 hectares. It noted, however, that 30 percent of the crop was being grown clandestinely. The report added that Bolivia's official annual coca production is about 25,000 tons; about 15 to 25 kilograms of pure cocaine are obtained from each ton of coca leaf. The amount of illicit cocaine was not estimated by the report. (See Am Emb La Paz 3920, 18 May 1978 for latest estimate

*US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) Translations on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Published by JPRS, 1000 Glebe Road, Arlington, Va. 22201.

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of coca leaf being diverted from legal channels into illicit cocaine production. The figure cited is a hypothetical maximum; seizures, spoilage, and other losses have not been taken into account in the report.) [REDACTED]

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BURMA--Over 10,000 Acres of Poppy Razed--TNDD, No. L/7808, p. 19. According to the Rangoon Domestic Service, Operation "Mountaintop Flower"--the opium poppy eradication program in Burma--resulted in the destruction of about 10,300 acres of opium poppies between 10 December 1977 when the operation began and the end of April. About 9,000 acres of poppies were destroyed during the government's eradication campaign last year. [REDACTED]

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DENMARK--Narcotics Authorities Expect Increase in Cocaine From Germany--TNDD, No. L/7796, pp. 60-61. A narcotics consultant in the Department of Education views cocaine as even more dangerous than heroin, and is concerned over the increasing amounts entering Denmark. He claims the abuse of cocaine spreads like rings on the water from the curious and young in the upper middle class to groups that are not as well off and who are in a weaker social and economic situation. He personally views the psychological dependence associated with cocaine as more serious than the physical addition of heroin because not all heroin users become addicts, but according to the Danish spokesman, cocaine is a drug that leaves very few users unaffected. [REDACTED]

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DENMARK--Lack of Effective Liaison With Dutch Hurts Drug Case--TNDD, No. L/7796, pp. 64-66. A court case in Copenhagen has revealed a serious lack of communications between Dutch and Danish police according to an item in the Danish press. It claims that the Dutch police tapped telephone conversations of the accused for four months before they informed the narcotics police in Copenhagen about the investigation.

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that had been under way. The information about the lack of cooperation came out during the trial of the accused. [REDACTED]

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DENMARK--Arrests of Danes and Italian Smugglers Arouses Suspicion of Mafia Tie--TNDD, No. L/7796, pp. 67-68. The involvement of three Italian smugglers in a narcotics case has led to suspicion that the Mafia is behind the smuggling effort valued at about \$6 million. According to the press, this is the second time in the past few months when "it has been proved" that the Mafia is slowly working its way into the Danish narcotics market. It claims that during the closed court hearings, the courier confirmed that the Mafia was behind the smuggling. The two Italians were charged with having smuggled 2 kilograms of pure heroin into Denmark from New Delhi using the Aero-flot airline and flying via Moscow. (Note: This information suggests that the Moscow route and India as a point of origin may be more prominent in narcotics smuggling than had previously been indicated.) [REDACTED]

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EGYPT--Hashish and Opium Seized in Cairo--TNDD, No. L/7796, pp. 56-57. The Narcotics Control Division of the Intelligence Service recently seized about \$635,000 worth of narcotics in an abortive smuggling attempt. Information gathered by the Intelligence Service indicated that a large supply of hashish and opium had been smuggled across the eastern desert and was to be brought to Cairo for sale during the Spring Holiday. The source of the confiscated narcotics was not divulged. [REDACTED]

25X1

KUWAIT--Trafficking Technique Described--TNDD, No. L/7808, pp. 130-131. A gang was able to smuggle some 46 sacks of drugs (hashish) from Lebanon to Kuwait via Syria but the drug was seized when the automobile being used was involved in an accident. The car had special hidden compartments built into the body; but they were uncovered as a result of the front end damage during the accident. (Note: The ultimate destination of the illicit drugs is not indicated in the press item; the route, however, is similar to that involved in another smuggling attempt [REDACTED]) [REDACTED]

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NORWAY--Police Cite Increased Narcotics Deaths, Ask for More Agents--TNDD, No. L/7808, pp. 135-137. The narcotics section of the Oslo police station is being organized to function as a central narcotics agency which will aid other police stations throughout the country in narcotics trafficking cases. The article notes that there has been a marked increase in the number of narcotics deaths in Norway since the first of the year. Six deaths have been reported thus far, compared to eight for all of 1977. Other deaths have occurred in which narcotics were involved but where death was not the direct result of drug overdose. According to a forensic medical student in Sweden, 60 persons in the Stockholm area alone lost their lives last year as a result of using hard narcotics. Hashish and marijuana dominate the reports of confiscation in Oslo, but according to a top police official, many narcotics addicts admit that they became involved with hard narcotics as a direct result of the home parties in which hashish was being used. [REDACTED]

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SPAIN--Report Claims Drug Consumption Increased 100 Percent in 1977--TNDD, No. L/7796, pp. 74-79. The escalation of drug use in Spain alarms and worries responsible segments of the society. Numerous statistics are presented to show the high incidence and marked increase in crime statistics and in narcotics seizures in recent years. In 1967 prisoners numbered only 293; by 1977 the total had reached 5,417 for the comparable 12 month period. By 1977, 80 percent of those arrested were Spaniards. The conclusion was drawn that Spain has ceased to be merely a transit area for drugs. The number of seizures of illicit drugs follows a similar trend: in 1967 there were 204 seizures by the police; in 1977 the figure had grown to 2,725. Substances confiscated showed cocaine seized in 1970 totaled 8 grams; in 1977 this figure was 23,000 grams. In 1970, 80 grams of opiates were seized; in 1977 2,000 grams were seized. The article estimates that between 25,000 and 30,000 Spaniards are heroin addicts. [REDACTED]

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SWEDEN--Agency Reports Increase in Drug-Related Deaths--TNDD, No. L/7808, pp. 144-145. At least 150 drug addicts died last year (in Sweden) directly or indirectly because of their addiction, according to a study by a state agency. The study includes the years 1975-1977. There is clearly an increasing trend in the number of deaths; from 1975 to 1977 the number has doubled, and most of them occur in Stockholm where half of the country's drug addicts live. [REDACTED]

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THAILAND--Drug Trade Problems Discussed--TNDD, No. L/7808, pp. 56-64. This item is based on a series of articles appearing in the Far Eastern Economic Review which is published in Hong Kong. The articles deal generally with Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak's decision to order the expulsion of Khun Sa (Chan See-fu) and the Shan United Army from Thailand. Khun Sa made himself persona non grata to the Thai Government by his letter, published in a Thai magazine, which drew attention to his illicit narcotics activities. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] The articles admit that the move against the Shans does not guarantee that they will not be replaced by other traffickers, or that at some later date they will not themselves return to their Thai base areas. (Note: There has even been some speculation that the SUA will not actually pull out of Thailand but they they will either go undercover or mask their identity.) Under the terms of the Thai Government's ultimatum, the SUA has until early July to leave Thai soil. There continues to be fear in Bangkok that Thai pressure will drive the SUA and some other insurgent groups into the hands of the Burmese Communist Party. Traditionally, the Burmese insurgent groups have been viewed by the Thais as an effective "barrier" against Communist expansion into Thailand. [redacted]

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